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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON PUBLIC FINANCE 1
IN SOUTH CAROLINA
HUGER SINKLBR*
Municipal corporations, like private corporations, are seldom in
a-position -to pay cash for important capital outlays. Consequently,
when the demand for increased service requires large expenditures
for capital improvements, municipal corporations, like private cor-
porations, must go aborrowing. This is true as a practical matter
even in instances where there is no limit upon the annual tax rate
which may be levied by the municipal corporation, for "to pay as
you go" would require a tax levy so large that the individual tax-
payer might well have to go in debt to pay his share of the cost of the
particular improvement. In this day and time of high income taxes,
the interest rate paid by the individual is usually double or treble
the interest borne by the tax-free public security. Hence, it is ob-
viously fairer to all concerned that the municipal corporation go in
debt and pay interest at some rate approximating 2%, rather than
to have the taxpayer go in debt to pay his share of the cost of the
capital improvement, and pay interest on his debt thus incurred at
perhaps 5%. Such a procedure seems all the more justified in in-
stances where the term of the debt does not extend beyond the use-
fulness of the project financed thereby.
In the case of a private corporation, the incurring of debt can
generally be done by the board of directors -f the corporation, and
always with the approval of its stockholders, but in the case of the
municipal corporation it is frequently the case that the directors (the
municipal officeholders) alone may not borrow, and in some instances,
*B.A., College of Charleston; Legal Education, University of South Carolina- Member,
City Council of Charleston, 1939-43. Member, State Legislature, 1932-36, and 1945-46.
Member of Charleston County, South Carolina and American Bar Associations. Member
of firm of inkler, Gibbs & Simons Charleston, South Carolina. Nationally accepted
authority on South Carolina Municipal Bonds.
1. For the purposes of this Article, the terms "public finance" or "municipal
finance" are used to denote the long term borrowings by the State, its coun-
ties, cities and towns, and other subdivisions, which are evidenced by obliga-
tions containing a pledge of the taxing power of the unit borrowing the money.
Borrowing in anticipation of the collection of taxes, and borrowing by the is-
suance of bonds payable solely from the revenues of some specified source are
not dealt with, unless in the latter instance a pledge of the taxing power is
made as additional security. This latter subject, viz., revenue bonds, is one-
of sufficient importance to require its own treatment. Furthermore, public fi-
nance through the issuance of bonds payable solely from the revenues of some
specific source was not in vogue at the time our present Constitution was writ-
ten.
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even the stockholders (the municipal taxpayers) cannot authorize
the borrowing.
It is the purpose of this article to discuss some of the Constitu-
tional restrictions surrounding the borrowing by the State and its
subdivisions, the conditions which existed at the time these restric-
• tions were written, the way they have been interpreted, and the
effect of the restrictions as thus interpreted upon the economic life
of the State. The Constitutional provisions which will be discussed
restrict, what would otherwise be an unlimited power in the General
Assembly to create debt for the State and, in turn, to authorize the
several subdivisions of the State to incur indebtedness. For, it is
an accepted proposition of Constitutional Law that a State Consti-
tution is not a grant of power to the legislative body, but a set of
restrictions limiting an otherwise unlimited power in the legislative
branch.
Since its disavowance of allegiance to the British Crown, South
Carolina has had five Constitutions. The first two were of short
duration, but the third, that of 1790, lasted until superseded by the
Constitution of 1868. In none of these first three Constitutions is
there any restriction on the incurring of debt by the State or its
subdivisions.
Now, the first question considered by those inquiring into the
validity of public securities is whether the purpose for which the
expenditure is made is a lawful one. This is a most important
step, for frequently there are provisions limiting the purposes for
which taxes may be levied or debt incurred. Hence, the case of
State ex rel Copes v. the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Charles-
ton, decided by the South Carolina Court of Errors in 1857, fur-
nishes an interesting insight on the judicial attitude toward this
question under the Constitution of 1790.
Copes, a taxpayer of Charleston, sought to invalidate the action
of the City Council of that City in issuing more than Two Million
Dollars of bonds to pay for stock subscriptions, which had been
taken in several railroad companies. The taxpayer was particular-
ly aggrieved by the fact that some of the railroad companies did not
even operate within the State of South Carolina. But, he failed
to gain the ear of the Court, either on Circuit or on Appeal. Judge
ONeall rendered both decisions. Citing general language in the
Charter of the City of Charleston, which enabled the City Council
to make assessments (levy taxes) "for the safety, convenience, bene-
fit and advantage of the said City", he held that these provisions
permitted the City Council to subscribe for stock in railroad com-
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panies and to assess the taxpayers of the City for the same. On
Appeal, Judge O'Neall reasoned thus:
That the General Assembly have all the powers, which the
respondents have exercised in their corporation in and for the
whole State, I have no doubt. If they (the General Assembly)
thought proper, they could build a railroad, with just as much
propriety as a Granite State House. Both might lead to an extra-
vagant waste of money, but still the power cannot be questioned.
They have dug canals, and built roads, and I have no doubt they
will do so again. They have subscribed to railroads in and with-
out the State, and it is very possible, they may do so again.
For all these purposes, they have directed bonds to be issued
and sold, and for their payment have taxed the property of
the State. The powers of the General Assembly in all these
respects seem to me to be undoubted, and if so, why may they
not clothe a municipal corporation with the same powers to be
exercised for the benefit of the people of their charge? It seems
to me to be clear they can.
He continued:
The only enquiry legitimate and proper is whether a subscrip-
tion to a railroad in the State or without the State may not be
necessary for the "welfare or conveniency of the city?" Who
is to decide that question. The Court? Certainly not. It is
by the words of the charter left to the City Council. But let
us examine the matter slightly. Charleston in 1783 was looked
to as a commercial city. She had realized the importance of
commerce in a very striking degree between 1776 and 1783. Be-
fore war in reality brooded over her very hearth stones, from
1776 to 1780, her merchants became indeed princes, but from
the fall of the city in May 1780 to 1783, she became a garrison
town, and saw wealth and commercial enterprise take to them-
selves wings and flee away. It was therefore of great impor-
tance to promote the means and channels of commerce. That
from that day to this has been a prime consideration. Why was
the Hamburg Railroad conceived and begun? Was it not to
promote the commerce and convenience of the city? Why was
the Louisville, Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad projected?
Was it not to connect the queen cities of the -west and south?
Why have all the railroads, in the State and out of the State,
to which Charleston has contributed, been built? Certainly pre-
sently or remotely to benefit Charleston. Have they not ans-
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wered the ends intended? I have no hesitation in saying that
though it is probable, there have been instances in which little
has been done, where much was expected, for the benefit of
the city, that yet in the main they have contributed much to the
"welfare and conveniency" of the city. Go back to the period
when the Charleston and Hamburg Road was contemplated;
when its noble founders Black, Aiken, and others, calculated its
income, as a paying concern from the daily travel of five or. six
passengers in the mail coaches of that time, and compare it with
its present annual income of more than a million and a half,
and ask has it not contributed to the "welfare and conveniency"
of the city? How has it been enabled to do this? Is it not by
its connection with the roads within and without the State which
have been helped to be built by the generous contributions of
the city? So it seems to me. Considered in this way, I have
therefore no doubt about the powers exercised. But really there
is no necessity for such an argument. What is a corporation?
It is an artificial person, capable not only of exercising given
powers, but also of ouning real and personal property. (Italics
added.)
The italicized language gives an insight into the Court's view-
point on the powers of a municipal corporation under the Constitu-
tion of .1790. And not to be overlooked, is the fact that the Court
saw no great difference between powers of a municipal corporation
and powers of a private corporation.
Such is not the case today. There is a marked distinction between
powers of a municipal corporation and those of a private corpora-
tion. This i' well illustrated in the case of Luther v. Wheeler, 73
S. C. 83, 52 S. E. 874, 4 LRA (NS) 746 (1905), wherein the dis-
tinguished Judge Woods states:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a muni-
cipal corporation possesses and can exercise the following pow-
ers, and no others: First, those granted in express words; sec-
ond, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the
powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the declared
objects and purposes of the corporation - not simply conveni-
ent, but indispensable. Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning
the existence of power is resolved by the courts against the
corporation and the power is denied .... The power to borrow
money is not a necessary incident of municipal life, and hence
does not exist unless expressly given, or unless some duties are
4
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imposed or powers conferred on the corporation which manifest-
ly could not be exercised at all without borrowing money ....
The contrary view was taken in a number of the earlier cases
cited in 1 DILLON ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS,..Par. 118, and
by some of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United
States, in Nashville v. Ray, supra. There is now, however,
little, if any, judicial dissent from the view that municipal
officers are not the general fiscal agents of the corporation, with
the implied power to borrow money for corporate purposes.
This conviction of the courts has been greatly strengthened by
the disasters which have befallen so many communities, grow-
ing out of the negligent and fraudulent misappropriation of
money, borrowed by counties, cities and towns.
In the case of Bolton v. Wharton, 163 S. C. 242, 161 S. E. 454,
86 ALR 1101 (1931), recovery was sought on a note which was
issued to derive funds with which to underwrite stock in a proposed
silk manufacturing corporation intended to be located in Union. Ap-
parently, the note was issued because the City was "inspired to
such action by the mirage of benefits that were expected to accrue
to the City 'from increased taxable values, from advancement of
property values generally and from increased impetus to the com-
mercial life of the community' by reason of the formation of such
corporation". Denying a recovery, the Court said:
The power given to the city council to issue bonds, so as to
bind not only the taxpayers of the city, but their children as
well, is a very high confidence and trust, and can be properly
exercised for no other purpose than "for the public use of the
corporation", no matter how great the temptation may be ....
We cannot suppose that it was intended to give the city council,
as such, the right to go into commerce, to buy for the purpose
of selling foods, or to enter into any private business or specula-
tion whatever. Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville (1890)
33 S. C. 1, 24, 11 S. E. 434, 438, 8 L. R. A. 291. The language
of Mr. Justice Marion in Haesloop v. City Council of Charles-
ton, supra, 123 S. C. page 286, 115 S. E. 596, 601, seems de-
cisive that these obligations were not issued to realize funds to
be put to a purpose "essentially public" in their nature: "In
ascertaining what is a public purpose within- the power to tax,
such benefits from a proposed expenditure as will accrue from
increased taxable values, from enhancement of property values
generally, and from increased impetus to the commercial life
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of the community will ordinarily be considered of too incidental
or secondary a. character to justify an outlay of public funds".
Applying these rules of law to the instant obligations, it seems
beyond cavail that the notes were not issued for a valid public
purpose.
One might well stop and ask what had intervened between the
time of these cases to cause so marked a divergence in judicial hold-
ing. The answer is, war, the most destructive yet to fall upon this
Nation, had impoverished South Carolina. And, the peace which
immediately followed could well be compared to a plague of locusts.
With the government of the state in the hands of ignorant blacks
and unprincipled whites, South Carolina was "Reconstructed" to
the tune of tax, steal and spend.
The first step toward its readmission to the Union had been the
adoption of a Constitution, containing a provision against slavery
(Section 2, Article I, Constitution of 1868), a declaration that the
Union was indissoluble (Section 5, Article I, Constitution of 1868),
and a prohibition against paying debts contracted during the late
"Rebellion" (Section 16, Article IX, Constitution of 1868).
"Reconstruction", as South Carolina was to know it had not
reached its fearful climax, when the Constitution of 1868 was adopt-
ed and when the document is compared with its predecessor it does
not now seem designed to promote the rascality which soon followed.
Many parts of this document live today as a part of our Constitution
of 1895, and many of its provisions are excellent. While there were
no limitations on the extent of debt that might be incurred, provi-
sions were inserted which limited the right to levy taxes for corpor-
ate purposes, and, thus, the extravagant speculation complained of
in the Copes case would seem prohibited. The procedure by which
the debt of the State might be incurred required a two-thirds vote
of the membership of each Branch, duly recorded on the Journals
of the House. It seems safe to say that these provisions were in-
tended to have a conservative effect. Consequently, it should be
recognized that the rascality, stealing and unjustified borrowings that
took place during Reconstruction could have occurred just as easily
had not the Constitution of 1790 been superseded by that of 1868.
But, there seems no doubt but that the careless spending during
Reconstruction days is directly -responsible for the limitations of the
extent of debt which found their way into the Constitution of 1895
which we now discuss.
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I.
PuRPosEs FOR WHICH BONDS MAY Br ISSUZD
A. Incorporated Cities and Towns
The case of Marshall v. Rose, 213 S. C. 428, 49 S. R. 2d 720
(1948), clearly sets forth the purposes for which incorporated cities
or towns may levy taxes and issue general obligation bonds. It
was held in that case that the power to incur indebtedness is permitted
when authorized by law for public purposes (Article VIII, Section
3) and the power to assess and collect taxes is permitted for cor-
porate purposes. Hence, in order to justify the incurring of debt
by an incorporated city or town it must be demonstrated that the
purpose for which the debt is to be incurred is both public and cor-
porate. In the Marshall v. Rose case, it was held that a recreational
center and swimming pool are proper purposes for which bonds may
be issued, and in so holding the Court stated that the Constitutional
provisions referred to (Sections 3 and 6, of Article VIII) were
not intended to limit municipal expenditure to the absolute necessi-
ties of the citizens. Had such been the intention of the framers of
the Constitution, more restrictive language would have been used
than that which limited the incurring of debt to public purposes,
ind the levy of taxes to corporate purposes. The Court stated that
it was the intention of the Constitution to authorize a reasonable
use of public money for objects designed to promote the general
welfare.
While it is not the intention of this article to catalogue the pur-
poses for which an incorporated city or town may issue bonds, it
can be noted in passing that the Court recently declared that a munici-
pal airport as a proper purpose for which the City of Greenville might
issue bonds, in the case of Evatte v. Cass, 217 S. C. 62, 59 S. R. 2d
638 (1950), which case settled the question whose existence was
noted in the cases of Brailsford v'. Walker, 205 S. C. 228, 31 S. R.
2d 385 (1944), and Parrott v. Gourdin, 205 S. C. 364, 32 S. E. 2d
14 (1944).
It is to be observed in passing that the word "corporate" as used
in Section 6 of Article VIII does not seem to be synonymous with
the word "public" as used in Section 3. It is conceivable that what
might well be a public purpose would not necessarily be a corporate
purpose. Perhaps, a far-fetched illustration will serve to denote the
distinction. The City of Charleston should certainly be enjoined
from issuing bonds to pay for a waterworks system in Columbia.
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The system, as such. might be a public purpose but, obviously, it
would not be a corporate purpose to the City of Charleston.
B. Counties and Other Political Subdivisions
By Section 5, of Article X of the Constitution, it is provided that
the corporate authorities of the counties, townships, school districts,
cities, towns and villages may be vested with power to assess and
collect taxes for corporate purposes. However, Section 6 of Article
X imposes a strict limitation upon the rather broad grant of power
made by Section 5, insofar as counties and townships are concerned.
Section 6 of Article X provides that the General Assembly should
not have power to authorize a county or township to levy a tax or
issue bonds for any purpose except those enumerated therein.
The County, as it was conceived by those who wrote the Consti-
tution of 1895, was not intended to perform many functions, and
while home rule was not prohibited (cf. Gaud v. Walker, 214 S. C.
451, 53 S. E. 2d 316 (1949) ), it was not provided for, as was the
case in the Constitution of 1868. (Section 19, of Article IV of the
Constitution of 1868.) At that time, the State was either urban or
rural. The unincorporated suburb of today was unknown. In a
great many low-country counties, a black majority existed. Hence,
while these black majorities might be gerrymandered, as by the
creation of a huge Berkeley County and the reduction of Charleston
County to a very small area, including little more than the City of
Charleston, unless the government of the counties was effected on
a State-wide basis, blacks would rule in parts of the State. Further-
more. Tillman, a moving spirit in the Constitution of 1895, en-
visioned the control of county governments through State-wide fac-
tions. Completely overlooked (?) was the possibility that legisla-
tive courtesy, which is now so much the order of the day, would
permit the domination of the counties by the Senator and the mem-
bers of the House of Representatives from the particular County,
with the rest of the General Assembly taking no part whatsoever in
the enactment of its local legislation. But, at any rate, it seems obvi-
ous that it was never the intention for the County to perform too
many of the public functions, and our Court has literally followed
the restrictive provisions of Section 6, of Article X.
Its views on this subject are ascertained in: Gentry v. Taylor,
192 S. C. 145, 5 S. E. 2d 857 (1939), and Parrott v. Gourdin, supra,
both denying the right of a County to issue bonds for an airport.
(The Constitution was later amended to permit this.) Doran v.
Roberfson, 203 S. C. 434, 27 S. E. 2d 714 (1943), prohibiting a
8
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County-wide bond issue to obtain funds to construct sewers in a
thickly settled section of the County on the ground that sewers are
a local improvement, a result which seems eminently fair; and, Powell
v. Thomas, 214 S. C. 376, 52 S. E. 2d 782 (1949), holding that while
a War Memorial might be a public purpose, it was not one of the
purposes enumerated in Section 6 of Article X. The opinion there
states:
But the fact that the erection of this War Memorial would
subserve a public purpose does not solve the question now pre-
sented for determination. As we endeavored to point out in
Parrott v. Gourdin et al., 205 S. C. 364, 32 S. E. 2d 14, a pro-
posed expenditure may be for a public purpose or a corporate
purpose and yet not be among the purposes enumerated in Ar-
ticle X, Section 6, for which the General Assembly is empowered
to authorize a county to levy a tax or issue bonds. We are im-
pelled to hold that the erection of structures for promotion of
patriotism, although the most elemental of public purposes, since
in patriotism rests the preservation of the republic, is not for
a purpose embraced in this section of the Constitution. It is
significant that although the framers of the Constitution were
fully aware of the custom in South Carolina of erecting statues,
monuments and memorials to the soldiers and sailors of various
wars and in commemoration of great public events, no excep-
tion for this purpose was made in the Constitutional limitation
above mentioned.
It follows that the issuance of bords for the erection of this
War Memorial cannot be sustained unless it further appears
that it will subserve one of the purposes named in Article X,
Section 6 ....
While, again, no effort will be made to catalogue purposes for
which counties or lesser units may issue general obligation bonds, it
is to be noted that both hospitals and public auditoriums have been
held to fall within the category of public buildings, which is one of
the purposes enumerated in Section 6 of Article X. Battle v. Willcox,
128 S. C. 500, 122 S. E. 516 (1924) ; Smith v. Robertson, 210 S. C.
99, 41 S. E. 2d 631 (1949) ; and, Cothran v. Mallory, 211 S. C. 387,
45 S. E. 2d 599 (1947).
C. The State
South Carolina has outstanding many millions of dollars of bonds
which have been issued subsequent to the adoption of its present
Constitution. But, to the best of the writer's knowledge, the bonds
9
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that have been issued since 1895 have been held validly issued pur-
suant to legislative enactment, and not subject to any limitation found
in the Constitution. The principal debt consists of Highway bonds,
which are specially secured by part of the gasoline tax. Although
for the payment of these bonds, the faith and credit of the State are
pledged, our Court has held that the provisions of Sections 7 and 11
of Article X did not control their issuance. State ex rel Richards v.
Moorer, 152 S. C. 455, 150 S. E. 269 (1929).
Unfortunately, the meaning or effect of Section 7 is not discussed
in the majority opinion. But, in the course of his dissenting opinion
in the Moorer case, supra, Justice Blease states that the provisions
of Section 7 of Article X limit the purposes for which the State
might incur debt. With a reluctance born of respect for the learn-
ing of this Jurist, the writer is not satisfied that Section 7 was in-
tended to limit the purposes for which the State might incur debt.
To evaluate the effect of Section 7, consideration must also be given
to Section 11 of Article X.
Section 7 of Article X reads as follows:
No scrip, certificate or other evidence of State indebtedness
shall be issued except for the redemption of stock, bonds or other
evidence of indebtedness previously issued, or for such debts
as are expressly authorized in this Constitution.
The pertinent portions of Section 11 of Article X are as follows:
To the end that the public debt of South Carolina may not
hereafter be increased without the due consideration and free
consent of the people of the State, the General Assembly is here-
by forbidden to create any further debt or obligation, either by
the loan of the credit of the State, by guaranty, endorsement
or otherwise, except for the ordinary and current business of
the State without first submitting the question as to the crea-
tion of such new debt, guaranty, endorsement or loan of its
credit to the qualified electors of this State at a general State
election; and unless two-thirds of the qualified electors of this
State, voting on the question, shall be in favor of increasing the
debt, guaranty, endorsement, or loan of its credit, none shall
be created or made. And any debt contracted by the State shall
be by loan on State bonds, of amounts not less than fifty dollars
each, bearing interest, payable not' more than forty years after
final passage of the law authorizing such debt.
10
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Read alone, or with Section 11, the effect of Section 7 is quite
puzzling, and it is only after considering its historical background
that its obscurity vanishes. Section 7 of Article X was plucked
bodily from the Constitution of 1868, where it was Section 10 of
Article IX. Fortunately, or unfortunately, as the case may be, all
of Article IX of the Constitution of 1868 did not follow Section 7.
This is undoubtedly the reason why it is difficult to understand.
The correct meaning of this Section, as a part of the Constitution
of 1868, was the subject of considerable discussion in the case of
State v. Cardozo, 5 S. C. 297 (1874). And, its true meaning seems
correctly set forth in the dissent of Justice Willard in that case,
rather than in the majority opinion. Two of Justice Willard's breth-
ren of that carpet-bag court did not agree with his views. Was it
for the reason, that had they done so, the State would not have been
called upon to pay appropriations made by the profligate carpet-bag
legislature? At any rate, the majority opinion is unconvincing. In
his dissent, Justice Willard points out that the meaning of this Sec-
tion cannot be ascertained by considering it alone. He states that
to get at its true meaning, it is necessary to consider it "by reference
to the more general subject and object to which the whole of Article
IX has reference". He notes that under Sections 7 and 14 of Ar-
ticle IX of the Constitution of 1868, the Legislature was given power
to create long term debt for extraordinary purposes, which long
term debt was required to be in the form of bonds of the State. He
also noted that the provisions of this Article of the Constitution
clearly indicated it was up to the Legislature to levy taxes for the
ordinary expenditures of the State and to pay any deficiency from
the preceding year. He then concluded that Section 10 was intended
for the purpose of providing a means of converting obligations al-
ready created, into obligations of a different form or class, as, for
example, the conversion of negotiable bonds into non-negotiable
stock, or the conversion of either of the last named obligations
"into some form of scrip or evidence of debt capable of molding the
obligation to suit the holder or the convenience of the treasury".
And, he was of the belief that the Section was also intended to prohi-
bit the ill-advised issuance of scrip or evidence of indebtedness which
-might have more or less general circulation among the public and
thus become an easy means of the creation of a floating debt. Jus-
tice Willard, in effect, determined that while the State might issue
bonds for extraordinary purposes, it would have to operate on a
pay as you go basis for its ordinary expenditures.
His views on the subject of Article IX seem correct to the writer.
11
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Now, as already noted, while this Section forms a part of our pre-
sent Constitution, it comes into this Constitution without the other
provisions of the Constitution of 1868 which authorized the creation
of bonded debt for extraordinary purposes. Therefore, it must" be
construed in conjunction with its present day companion, Section 11,
which specifically authorizes the creation of debt "for the ordinary
and current business of the State", and which thus recognizes the
right of the State to borrow in anticipation of the collection of its
revenues for the purpose of meeting its annual appropriations. Also
to be noted is the fact that Section 11 sets forth a method of pro-
cedure by which long term debt of the State can be incurred and
provides that any debt voted in accordance with the provisions of
that Section shall be in State bonds in amounts of not less than fifty
dollars each .... and payable not more than forty years after the
final passage of the law authorizing such debt. Now, no where in
the present Constitution is there any provision authorizing the crea-
tion of debt except "for the ordinary and current business of the
State" as noted above. But, in Section 7, there is a provision which
removes the prohibition against the issuance of scrip, certificates,
or other evidence of State indebtedness "for such debts as are ex-
pressly authorized in this Constitution" or for the "redemption of
stock, bonds or other evidences of indebtedness previously issued".
Now, the refunding of existing debt has been held to be not the crea-
tion of new debt, for which reason the provisions of Section 11 have
no bearing on refunding bonds. State ex rel Robinson v. Tillnan,
39 S. C. 298, 17 S. E. 678 (1893). Similarly, in the case of Lott
v. Blackwoqd, 166 S. C. 58, 164 S. E. 439 (1932), the funding
into one bond issue of past due tax anticipatory indebtedness was
likewise held not subject to the Constitutional restrictions. What,
therefore, is the meaning of Section 7? There are really no debts
authorized by the Constitution. And, in neither a refunding nor
tax anticipatory operation is it necessary to observe the procedure
prescribed by Section 11. Was it therefore intended to prohibit the
issuance of long term debt? If so, what was the use of prescribing
in Section 11 a method by which bonds may be issued, if there is
no purpose under the Constitution for which bonds can be issued?
Yet, this would seem to be the impasse reached, if Section 7 of Ar-
ticle X is to have the meaning which is suggested by the dissenting
opinion in the Moorer case, referred to earlier. Most of Section 11
would have no meaning. The writer has concluded that the correct
interpretation to be given is that advanced by justice Willard, viz.,
that the intent of this Section is to prevent the issuance of scrip for
12
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the payment of current State debts. This conclusion is greatly
strengthened by reason of the fact that the term, bonds, is not used
in Section 7. But bonds as a form of long term debt were well
known to those who wrote the Constitution of 1895 and those who
wrote the Constitution of 1868. It seems almost certain that this
term would have been used in Section 7 if it had been intended to,
prohibit the creation of further bonded indebtedness. This results
in the conclusion that there is no provision in the Constitution limit-
ing the purpose for which the State may incur bonded debt, ex-
cept Section 6 of Article X and the due process clauses, all of which
require that the purpose be public in nature rather than private in
nature. This conclusion requires a distinction between the tax-antici-
patory borrowings, authorized by Section 11, and the issuance of
scrip. One exists. In the former case, the loan cannot be made
unless the taxes have actually been levied. In the latter instance,
the scrip could be issued once- an appropriation were made. The
distinction seems to be sound.
II.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURE
VOR THE INCURRING ov BONDED DEBT.
There is no provision in the Constitution restricting the method
by which counties or lesser units, such as townships or school dis-
tricts may incur debt. Evidently, it was felt that the provisions of
Section 6, of Article X of the Constitution, restricting the purposes
for which debt might be incurred, would suffice. However, there
are severely restrictive provisions imposed upon the manner of in-
curring debt by incorporated cities and towns and by the State.
Section 7, of Article VIII, prohibits the issuance of general obli-
gation bonds by cities and towns until an election be held and the
issuance of bonds favored by a majority of those voting in a special
election held to submit such question. Provisions of this sort are
frequent in many State Constitutions, but the really severe restric-
tions found in Section 13, of Article II, are those which prescribe
as a condition precedent to the ordering of such special bond elec-
tion, a petition signed by a majority of the freeholders in the in-
corporated municipality, as shown by its taxbooks, petitioning -the
governing body to order the election, and the further provision in
this Section, which limits suffrage in these bond elections to those
who "have paid all taxes. State, County and municipal for the previ-
ous year". At the time the Constitution was originally written,
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similar restrictive provisions on voting appeared for practically all
types of elections. However, those provisions of the Constitution
have been amended, easing the restrictions imposed upon suffrage.
There is no general amendment to the provisions of Section 13,
Article 11, and the original restrictions control. This frequently
results in confusion, for it is difficult to explain to persons who have
qualified themselves to vote for a mayor or aldermen why they may
not vote on the question of incurring bonded debt, without qualify-
ing themselves in the manner provided for by Section 13, of Article
I. The confusion will probably increase after the adoption of the
1950 proposal, further amending the Constitutional section dealing
with municipal registration.
2
The restriction in this Section requiring the signatures of a ma-
jority of the freeholders of the municipality as shown by its tax-
books has on at least one occasion caused the abandonment of a pro-
posed bond issue in the City of Columbia, and delayed a bond issue
in the City of Greenville for almost a year.
The State of South Carolina has outstanding many bonds, which
are direct obligations of the State, for whose payment the full faith,
credit and taxing power of the State are pledged. Yet, none of
these have been issued in keeping with the procedure envisioned by
that part of the present Constitution which deals with the method
by which the State may incur debt. We have seen that Section 11
of Article X is the Section of the Constitution which prescribes the
method by which the State may incur debt. It is no more nor less
than the 16th amendment to the Constitution of 1868, which became
a part of that Constitution in 1873, and was designed to prevent a
repetition of the vast peculations of which the corrupt officials of the
reconstruction government had been guilty. The provisions of this
Section provide that the State may not incur debt (except for ordi-
nary and current business of the State) without first submitting
the question as to the creation of such debt to the qualified electors
2. Section 12 of Article II of the Constitution as it now stands contains a
provision making it mandatory upon the General Assembly to provide for the
registration of municipal voters before each municipal election. Joint Resolu-
tion No. 1063, 46th Statutes at Large, page 2670, makes the proposal that this
provision be changed to one which would merely permit the General Assembly
to provide for additional registration, if it deems it desirable. The proposal
was voted for in the General Election in November and, if ratified by the
present General Assembly, will become a part of the Constitution. It seems
reasonable to believe that the General Assembly will do away with municipal
registration and permit municipal voting on County Registration certificates.
In other words, if one is qualified to vote in one election, one will be qualified
to vote in all elections, except those held under Section 13, of Article II, relat-
ing to the incurring of bonded debt.
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of the State in a general State election, and that unless two-thirds
of the qualified electors voting on the question shall favor the increas-
ing of the debt, no increase shall be made. So far as the writer
knows, the question of incurring bonded debt has not been sub-
mitted to the people of South Carolina, yet at the moment there
are outstanding many millions of dollars of general obligation bonds
of the State. These have been issued as a result of the decisions of
the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the most important of which
is the case of State ex rel Richards v. Moorer, supra, which hold
that the provisions of this Section do not prohibit the pledging of
the faith and credit of the State if, in the first instance, a special
fund is established which is sufficient in all likelihood, to discharge
the debt. The Moorer decision has probably had more effect upon
the economy of the State than any other Court decision of the 20th
century. Presumably, the required consent of the people to a bond
issue for highway improvement could not be obtained on the occasion
that the now famous 65 million dollar highway issue was proposed
(36th Statutes at Large, page 670). But, at that time, in the opinion
of the General Assembly, it was necessary: (a), to improve the
educational opportunities of the State by making possible the con-
struction of modern consolidated schools to be served by school
buses, (b), to promote agricultural interest by affording better trans-
portation facilities, (c), to promote industrial development of the
State by creating sites for factories outside the congested centers of
population, (d), to open up seashore and mountain resorts, and, (e),
to advertise the State's natural resources (see 36th Statutes at Large,
page 671). Not spelled out, but very much present in the minds of
the framers of the Bill was the impelling desire to get South Caro-
lina out of the mud. The law was upheld in the Moorer case by a
divided court, sitting en banc. From the vantage point of the
framers of the 1895 Constitution, and the legal scholar, the dis-
sents are extremely formidable. On the other hand, the action of
the majority has probably done more to promote and advance the
welfare of the State than any other thing, for it has made possible
the magnificent system of highways which we now possess.3
3. The Moorer case and others which followed were not overlooked by
the author of the dissent in the Washington case of Gruen v. Tax Commission,
211 Pa. 2d 651, November 23, 1949. The writer of that dissent states: "There
that State (South Carolina) is finding that the breach of the dyke of debt
limitation .... is rapidly widening. In Arthur v. Johnston, 185 S. C. 324,
the court complains (emphasis added) that special funds for bond payments
should be derived only from sources related, but admits that .... there is
no logical basis upon which it can distinguish an allocation of a part of the
State's income tax to the payment of bonds for the erection of buildings and
15
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III.
DEBT LIMITATIONS 4
There is no provision found in the Constitution limiting the amount
of debt that might be incurred by the State itself. Evidently it was
felt that the most effective method of control would consist-of the
provisions previously discussed. Nevertheless, the subject of debt
on the part of the municipalities, counties and subdivisions received
considerable attention.
It must be manifest that the makers of our present Constitu-
tion have exhibited great care to prevent any reckless issue of
bonds by its different governmental agencies.
The quotation is from Mr. Justice Pope's Opinion in the case of
Todd v. Laurens, 48 S. C. 395, 26 S. E. 682 (1896), decided March
3rd, 1897. He was commenting on the effects of the limitations im-
posed by Section 7 of Article VIII and Section 5 of Article X. While
the limitation in Section 7, of Article VIII, which limits the bonded
debt of incorporated cities and towns to eight per centum of the
assessed value of the taxable property therein had its counterpart as
Section 17, of Article IX of the Constitution of 1868 (which be-
came effective on the 12th day of December, 1884, 18th Statutes
at Large, page 689), the really effective limitation was that imposed
by Section 5, of Article X. Section 5 of Article X, provides:
And no county, township, municipal corporation or other po-
litical division of this State shall hereafter be authorized to
increase its bonded indebtedness if at the time of any proposed
increase thereof the aggregate amount of its already existing
bonded debt amounts to eight per centum of the value of all
taxable property therein as valued for State taxation. And
wherever there shall be several political divisions or municipal
corporations covering or extending over the territory, or por-
tions thereof, possessing a power to levy a tax or contract a
institutions of higher learning from its earlier cases . . . . South Carolina's
subsequent experiences might suggest: 'StopI Look! Listen!' " The fore-
going quotation is taken from the opinion of Justice Hill of the Washington
Supreme Court.
4. There are numerous items of bonded debt which are deductible in com-
puting debt limitations. There are bonds specially secured as, for instance,
paving certificates; there are bonds issued for utility purposes, viz., electric
light, sanitary sewer and waterworks systems, which are deductible by reason
of the Special Amendment of February, 1911; but this is a topic which would
require its own discussion. And, it is not the intent of the author to cover
the subject here.
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debt, then each of such political divisions or municipal corpora-
tions shall so exercise its power to increase its debt under the
foregoing eight per cent limitation that the aggregate debt over
and upon any territory in this State shall never exceed fifteen
per centum of the value of all taxable property in such territory
as valued for taxation by the State ....
In the Todd case which, as already noted, was almost contem-
poraneous with the effective date of the then new Constitution, the
leading opinion construes the provisions of Section 5 of Article X
quite literally and proceeds to calculate the debt of the Town of
Laurens by the mathematical formula which it prescribes. But,
the court was not unanimous in giving-to the Section its literal mean-
ing. Three judges merely concurred in result, with MclIver, the
Chief Justice, stating that he reserved his opinion as to whether
the bonded debt of the county could presumably be regarded as any
part of the bonded debt of the city. The action of the court pro-
phesied the ultimate fate of this restriction, for some twenty-seven
years later the fifteen per cent debt limit was, to all intents and pur-
poses, written out of the Constitution,
Nine years after the Todd case, in Lancaster School District v.
The Robinson-Humphrey Company, 64 S. C. 545, 42 S. E. 998
(1902), decided November 25th, 1902, the Supreme Court in a
short opinion states that the indebtedness of the State is not a
factor to be considered in ascertaining if a political subdivision ex-
ceeds its fifteen per cent debt limit. But the State's debt had not
been taken into account by Justice Pope, a fact noted in the opinion.
The general effect of this case is to strengthen Justice Pope's views.
One could be well justified in assuming that his opinion was now
accepted by the Court.
Between the time of these decisions and the case of Elliott v.
Heyward, 127 S. C. 468, 121 S. E. 257 (1924), decided February
'2nd, 1924, there are to be found numerous other cases in which
questions dealing with debt limitations -were involved, but in none
of them is there any clear expression of opinion on the subject.
Furthermore, some of these cases, which are later cited by the
Court as authority for the proposition that the fifteen per cent debt
limit did not control the incurring of debt, were decided on questions
of fact. Others dealt with the effect of special amendments to the
Constitution. Brief reference -is made to these, in an attempt to
summarize their holdings:
Seegers v. Gibbs, 72 S. C. 532, 52 S. E. 586 (1905), dealt solely
17
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with the effect of a Constitutional Amendment relating to the in-
debtedness of Columbia.
Bethea v. Town of Dillon, 91 S. C. 413, 74 S. R. 983 (1912), dealt
with the general amendment relating to waterworks bonds.
Lillard v. Melton, 103 S. C. 10, 87 S. E. 421 (1915), held that
certain special revenue bonds and paving certificates were deductible.
Beacham v. Greenille, 104 S. C. 421, 89 S. E. 401 (1916), mere-
ly affirms the Seegers case.
The decision in Nettles v. Cantwell, 112 S. C. 24, 99 S. E. 765
(1919), cites each of the above cases and the three earlier cases as
authority to permit the issuance of bonds by Charleston County,
alleged to be in excess of the fifteen per cent debt limit, without dis-
cussing the facts or the applicability of these decisions which could
not possibly be said to be harmonious. A very similar citation ap-
pears by the editor in the annotation found in 94 A. L. R. 818. The
annotation also cites Graham v. Ervin, 114 S. C. 419, 103 S. E. 750
(1920). But this case goes off on the facts and the construction of
the special Constitutional Amendment relating to the City of Florence
and, if anything, follows the leading opinion in the Todd v. Laurens
case, supra.
Then comes the Elliott case. The opinion is so short that it is
quoted in full:
This is in the original jurisdiction and is a petition for in-
junction, on a rule issued by the Chief justice.
The facts are undisputed. The sole question is whether the
proposed issue of bonds by Fairfield County violates Article X,
Section 5, of the Constitution of 1895. We are of the opinion
that it does not. It was never contemplated, and is not a fair
construction of this Section to say, that a county cannot issue
and sell bonds up to 8 per cent of the total assessed value of all
the property in the county.
The county is a unit, and is entitled to go to the limit of 8
per cent in issuing and selling bonds. The bonded indebted-
ness of a county is indivisible. It is upon the entire county,
and in the hands of the holders of the bonds the payment is
enforceable against the entire county, as a whole and as a unity,
and the bondholders cannot be required to resort to a subdi-
vision of the whole for a payment of a proportionate share of
the bonds.
The petition is refused.
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Next comes the case of Banks v. School District, 129 S. C. 218,
123 S. E. 834 (1924), decided June 9th, 1924. The decree of the
Circuit Judge, Judge Featherstone, was adopted as the opinion of
the Court. In the decree he discusses the Todd case, supra, and
comments on the fact that three of the four members of the Court
did not concur in the reasoning of the opinion but merely with its
results. His holding, as follows, is based on Elliott v. Heyward,
supra:
Evidently, if the 15% debt limit cannot be properly applied
to a County it would not be applicable to a school district, for
a county, township and school district are allowed under the
Constitution exactly the same power to issue and sell bonds.
This decision is followed by Bagnall v. Bridge District, 131 S. C.
109, 126 S. E. 644 (1924). In the opinion in that case, the Court
said:
It was never contemplated that a school district by issuing
bonds up to the limit prescribed by the Constitution could there-
by prevent the county from issuing bonds because the property
of the district would there be subjected to a rate of taxation
forbidden by the Constitution. The lesser cannot control the
greater to this extent.
Finally, comes the decision in Winstead v. Williams, 132 S. C. 365,
128 S. E. 46 (1925), decided May 26th, 1925, answering yes to the
question phrased in the opinion as:
Can a municipality issue bonds, exclusive of the water, sewer
and light bonds, to the full amount of 8%o of the assessed value
of property therein regardless of the bonded debt of other po-
litical subdivisions covered in whole or in part by said City or
Town?
From the foregoing, it will be seen that the Court has held that
the 15%o debt limit provision in the Constitution has no application
to counties, incorporated cities or towns and common school dis-
tricts. Countless thousands of bonds have been issued on the strength
of these decisions. There is one further case that should be men-
tioned, and that is the case of Powell v. Hargrove, 136 S. C. 345,
134 S. E. 380 (1926). Apparently, from a reading of the opinion,
an attack was made on the validity of bonds sought to be issued on
the ground that if the High School District exercised its 8%o debt
limit to the full it would violate the 15%o debt limit on at least a
19
Sinkler: Constitutional Limitations on Public Finance in South Carolina
Published by Scholar Commons, 1951
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW QUARTERLY
part of the territory comprising the High School District. The
Court did not squarely meet the issue, but merely said:
A very close reading of the Act shows that there is no dis-
position to violate any section of the Constitution as to the
limitation of bonded indebtedness by the county, or any po-
litical division or subdivision thereof. In Section 3, wherein
the authority to issue and sell bonds is given, it is distinctly
stated that such bonds shall not exceed 8 per centum of the
assessed valuation of the taxable property in each of the said
high school districts. And a further proviso is made that the
Act shall not be deemed or held to intend or purport to author-
ize the issuance of bonds in excess of any limit imposed by the
Constitution of the State. From the language of this Section,
it cannot be doubted that the Legislature had in mind all the
provisions of our Constitution with reference to the issuance of
bonds for public purposes, and that the whole purpose was to
stay, clearly within the letter and spirit of the Constitution.
(Italics added.)
Because of the foregoing, the writer has long felt that bonded
indebtedness of high school districts must stay within the 15% limi-
tation.
The latest case involving the effect of the fifteen per cent debt
limitation is the case of A'shmore v; Greater Greenville Sewer Dis-
trict, 211 S. C. 77, 44 S. E. 2d 88 (1947). The Court had rendered
one decision with which it was not satisfied; it afterwards determined
to have a rehearing. It asked counsel that all questions that might
possibly be involved be thoroughly briefed and allotted extra time
for argument when the matter was orally argued at the June term
of 1947. In the course of its decision, it took heed of the many
questions which had been discussed, including the right of the Dis-
trict involved in that case-a special purpose district created solely
to establish and operate a public auditorium-to issue bonds with-
out regard to the fifteen per cent debt limit. It decided that the
fifteen per cent debt limit must be observed, but decided that it
would stand by the earlier decisions which allowed counties, common
school districts, and incorporated cities or towns to regard only the
eight per cent debt limit. It is not without significance that the
author of the opinion, Mr. Justice Stukes, was among the counsel
in the case of Bagnall v. Birdge District, supra.
The writer feels that the Ashinore decision intended to set at rest
any further question on this subject and its effect is that we have,
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and yet we do not have, a fifteen per cent debt limitation to consider.
The limitation clearly has no application to common school districts,
counties and incorporated cities or towns. But, it must be observed
elsewhere.
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